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Introduction 
The Trump administration and members of Congress are making highly consequential decisions about U.S. 
nuclear weapons policies and key arms control agreements.   However, there has been little public debate and 
the public has had virtually no role in the process.   
 
For decades, the United States has tried to reduce nuclear risks by maintaining an effective deterrent while 
negotiating arms control and nonproliferation agreements with other countries. Now, some experts argue that 
potential adversaries are pursuing new nuclear, space, and cyber weapons, and may mistakenly conclude that 
they can take aggressive actions to advance their national interests unless the United States does more to 
convince them that it has numerous different types of nuclear options that it is prepared to use in response to 
both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks. Other experts counter that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is already 
more than sufficient to deter deliberate attack, and that the more likely nuclear risks come from proliferation, 
terrorist access, a renewed nuclear arms race, and misperception or crisis escalation leading to nuclear war that 
neither side really wants. They argue for greater self-restraint and cooperation with other countries. 
 
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review directed the development of several new types of nuclear weapons and 
explicitly expanded the range of circumstances under which the United States might use nuclear weapons, 
beyond response to a nuclear attack. The Trump administration announced plans to withdraw from the 1987 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement and is debating whether to extend the New START treaty 
limits on US and Russian long-range nuclear weapons past the current expiration date in early 2021. It has also 
expanded plans for a multi-decade program to modernize the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal and increase the 
capacity of its weapons production complex, positioning the United States to increase rapidly the number of 
nuclear weapons it has if the only existing strategic arms control treaty expires and a new arms race accelerates. 
In response, some members of Congress are holding hearings, sponsoring legislation, and taking other actions to 
preserve nuclear arms control agreements, prevent development of new types of nuclear weapons, scale back 
funding for nuclear modernization, and require Congressional approval for first use of nuclear weapons.   
 
The Program for Public Consultation and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland have 
conducted numerous studies of American public opinion on nuclear policy, using both standard polling methods 
and innovative public consultation methodology.  We have found that the latter works well to elicit thoughtful 
responses about complex policy problems, particularly when respondents do not already have much relevant 
knowledge. This method uses an online policymaking simulation to put respondents in a decision-maker’s shoes. 
Respondents receive a short, factual briefing about choices facing policymakers, evaluate arguments for and 
against various policy options, and make their policy recommendations.  The simulation design is reviewed by 
policy experts across the spectrum of views to ensure that the briefing is accurate and balanced, and that the 
pro and con arguments are the strongest ones being made by advocates. This method has proven quite 
successful in eliciting meaningful public input on policy issues that could not be effectively explored through 
standard polling.   
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Development of the Survey  
This policymaking simulation was developed during the fall of 2018. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 
Executive Branch statements, Congressional testimony, and other sources were used to help formulate the 
background and rationale for the policy options, and the key arguments for and against each option. We did not 
attribute arguments in the simulation to particular policy documents, hearings, or experts, though, to avoid 
giving respondents partisan cues that might inform their preferences. The draft text was reviewed by experts 
who support the Trump administration’s more expansive approach to nuclear policy and those who prefer a 
more restrained approach.  
 
Fielding of Survey  
The survey was fielded January 7 – February 1, 2019 by Nielsen-Scarborough with a probability-based 
representative sample of registered voters. The sample was provided by Nielsen-Scarborough from its larger 
sample, which is recruited by telephone and mail from a random sample of households. The survey itself was 
conducted online. Data collection ended the day before the Trump administration officially started the six-
month withdrawal process from the INF treaty. 
 
The full sample of 2,264 respondents (margin of error +/-2.1%) was presented the introductory briefing and 
some of the questions.  Some questions were asked to half the sample (margin of error +/-2.9%). See the 
questionnaire for more details.   
 
Responses were subsequently weighted by age, income, gender, education, and race. Benchmarks for weights 
were obtained from the US Census’ Current Populations Survey of Registered Voters. The sample was also 
weighted by partisan affiliation. 
 
A further analysis was conducted by dividing the sample six ways, depending on the PVI Cook rating of the 
respondent’s Congressional district.  This enabled comparison of respondents who live in very red, somewhat 
red, leaning red, leaning blue, somewhat blue, and very blue districts.  
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Summary of Key Findings 
NUCLEAR ARSENALS   
 
Response to the Number of Nuclear Weapons in US Arsenal and Globally 
When informed about the size of the US nuclear arsenal, a plurality of nearly half said that it was bigger than 
they expected, while only one in eight said it was smaller than they expected.  When presented the number of 
nuclear weapons of each of the other nuclear powers in the world, a majority said it was more than they 
expected with just one in seven saying it was fewer.   
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL  
 
US-Russian Arms Control Treaties  
More than eight in ten favor the US continuing to have arms control treaties with Russia, with support among 
Republicans comparable to that of Democrats.   
 
Extending New START 
Eight in ten favor the United States agreeing to extend the New START Treaty.  
 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
Two thirds, including a majority of Republicans, oppose withdrawing from the INF Treaty and favor instead 
staying within the Treaty and redoubling efforts to work with the Russians to address concerns of both sides.   
 
Nuclear Weapons Testing  
Overwhelming majorities from both parties approve of the US continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing, 
effectively abiding by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  In the event the US develops a 
technological innovation that might make it possible to build a new type of nuclear weapon that could destroy 
more of an adversary’s nuclear weapons, a majority still said they would oppose breaking the moratorium, 
though a bare majority of Republicans favored it. 
US NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES  
 
Minimum Retaliatory Capability 
Eight in ten or more from both parties support the US having a retaliatory nuclear capability destructive enough 
that no country could think that there would be any advantage in attacking the United States with nuclear 
weapons.    
 
Low Yield Warheads and the Need for Matching Nuclear Options 
Respondents were presented a rationale for developing nuclear capabilities over and above the minimum 
retaliatory capability based on the need to threaten to match any type of nuclear capability an adversary might 
use. When presented a specific example of the current debate over whether the US should put low-yield nuclear 
warheads on missiles on submarines to match corresponding Russian capabilities, a bipartisan majority of two 
thirds supported adding a low-yield option to nuclear missiles on submarines.  Yet, when asked about the 
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general principle, a plurality endorsed the view that a minimum retaliatory capability is adequate, over the view 
that the US must have the capability to retaliate against a major attack using only a type of weapon similar to 
the type the adversary used.  
 
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)  
Knowing that the United States currently has strategic weapons on submarines, bombers, and land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, six in ten, including a majority of Republicans, favor phasing out the ICBM 
force.  However, only one-third favor unilaterally reducing the net number of strategic warheads in the U.S. 
arsenal instead of putting more warheads on submarines and bombers to keep the same total as the Russians.  
 
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
  
US Declaratory Policy on First Use  
Only one in five endorsed the United States explicitly declaring that it would consider using nuclear weapons 
first and stating what kinds of non-nuclear attacks would prompt the United States to consider doing so.  Just 
slightly more than one in five favored explicitly declaring that the United States will never use nuclear weapons 
first.  A majority favored continuing the current policy of being ambiguous about whether and under what 
conditions the United States would consider using nuclear weapons first.  Presented a list of possible types of 
attack, less than one in six favored declaring that the United States would consider using nuclear weapons in 
response to any of them.   
 
Limiting Presidential First Use 
Two thirds, including six in ten Republicans, support Congressional legislation requiring that to use nuclear 
weapons first, the President would first have to consult Congress and it would have to issue a declaration of war 
on the country to be attacked with nuclear weapons.  
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FINDINGS 
NUCLEAR ARSENALS   
 
Response to the Number of Nuclear Weapons in US Arsenal and Globally 
When informed about the size of the US nuclear arsenal, a plurality of nearly half said that it was bigger than 
they expected, while only one in eight said it was smaller than they expected.  When presented the number 
of nuclear weapons of each of the other nuclear powers in the world, a majority said it was more than they 
expected with just one in seven saying it was fewer.   
 
To introduce respondents to nuclear weapons issues, they were given an initial briefing.  First, they were 
reminded of the scale of destructiveness of nuclear weapons, using the Hiroshima bomb as a baseline.  Next, 
respondents learned about the components of the U.S. nuclear arsenal: that it includes about 4,000 nuclear 
weapons of various types: strategic weapons on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers; about 150 non-strategic weapons; plus 2,200 weapons in 
storage. 
 
Respondents were then asked whether—
compared to what they had expected—the U.S. 
arsenal seemed bigger, smaller, or about the 
same.  The most common answer was that the 
arsenal was bigger than they had expected 
(47%), but four in ten (41%) said it was about the 
same; only 12% said it was smaller than 
expected.  A majority of Democrats said the 
arsenal was bigger than expected (57%), while a 
lesser third of Republicans (34%) felt this way.  
 
The briefing then gave a rundown of the world’s 
other nuclear arsenals: those of Russia, China, 
North Korea, France, Britain, India, Pakistan and 
Israel—with estimated numbers and how rapidly 
the weapons could be ready for 
use.  Respondents also saw a world map showing the nuclear powers and their arsenal sizes. 
 
Respondents were asked how this information compared with what they had expected. A clear majority (56%) 
said there were more nuclear weapons in the world than they had expected.  Twenty-nine percent said the 
number was about what they had expected; only 15% said there were fewer.  The reaction this time was more 
bipartisan, with half of Republicans (50%) saying the numbers of nuclear weapons were greater than they had 
expected (Democrats 61%, independents 56%).  
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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL  
 
US-Russian Arms Control Treaties  
More than eight in ten favor the US continuing to have arms control treaties with Russia, with support among 
Republicans comparable to that of Democrats.   
In setting the context for questions on nuclear arms control respondents were told about the condition of 
mutual vulnerability between the U.S. and Russia, meaning that each can inflict massive devastation on the 
other, regardless of who attacks first.  This has been the case since the 1950s, essentially unchanged by 
technological developments.  They were informed that, “countries with smaller nuclear arsenals also have the 
potential to inflict massive damage on each other.” 
They were told how the U.S. and other countries have developed a number of treaties to limit and reduce 
nuclear weapons.  After being given a summary of the most important provisions of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), they were asked whether they were aware that “that the U.S. has agreed to actively 
work together with other nuclear powers to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.”  Four fifths 
(82%) said they were aware of this basic commitment on the U.S.’s part; partisan differences were minor. 
 
They were then introduced to the topic of US-Russian nuclear arms control treaties by reading that the U.S. and 
Russia (previously the Soviet Union) “have entered into a number of treaties that have substantially reduced the 
number of nuclear warheads on each side” and that extensive inspection systems were put in place to verify 
this.   
 
They were told “There is some debate about 
these U.S-Russian arms control treaties,” and 
presented an argument in favor and an 
argument against such treaties. 
The argument supporting the treaties 
pointed out that the U.S. and Russia “have 
dismantled thousands of nuclear weapons” 
thanks to their framework and said mutual 
suspicion has been reduced relative to the 
Cold War years.  Seven in ten (69%) found 
this argument convincing, including 67% of 
Republicans and 74% of Democrats but less 
independents (62%).  
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The counter-argument dismissed “the idea 
that we should accept that we are vulnerable 
to a devastating nuclear attack” and said that 
arms control treaties “tie our hands,” 
preventing the U.S. from leveraging its 
technological advantages to build a superior 
arsenal.  It did not reject the idea of 
deterrence but argued superiority would 
enhance deterrence.  Only 45% found this 
convincing, with parties significantly split. A 
clear majority of Republicans (58%) found it 
convincing, while only one third of Democrats 
did. In very red districts only, a bare majority 
of 51% found it convincing. 
After reviewing the arguments, respondents 
were asked whether or not they approved of 
“the U.S. continuing to have arms control 
treaties with Russia.”  Over four in five (83%) 
supported continuation-- a much larger 
majority than either argument gained.  
Democrats, Republicans and independents 
were all at 80% or higher.  Respondents who 
voted for Donald Trump and those who voted 
for Hilary Clinton were no different—in both 
cases 83% were in support.  
Interestingly, the number supporting 
continuing to have arms control treaties with 
Russia was even higher than the number who 
found the argument in favor convincing, 
suggesting that there may be more reasons 
that people support arms control treaties than 
those expressed in the argument.      
 
Extending New START 
Eight in ten favor the United States agreeing to extend the New START Treaty.  
 
Later in the survey respondents were told that “Another debate is over whether the U.S. and Russia should 
extend an arms control agreement called the New START Treaty.”  
They were given a briefing on the Treaty as follows:  
It was signed in 2010 and approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 71-26. The Treaty requires each side to 
limit its deployed strategic nuclear warheads (the kind that can reach the other country) on land-based 
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missiles, submarine-launched missiles and 
long-range bombers to equal levels. Extensive 
verification systems were put in place. There 
are now 18 on-site inspections per side each 
year, plus various forms of information 
sharing about each side’s arsenal. The New 
START Treaty expires in 2021 but can be 
extended for five years if both sides agree.  
Respondents evaluated arguments for and 
against an extension of New START.   
The argument for extension pointed out that if 
New START expired, there would be no 
limitations on U.S. and Russian long-range 
nuclear weapons for the first time since 1972 
and asserted that a new arms race would likely 
ensue.  Well over four in five (84%) found this 
argument convincing, with little party 
differentiation. 
The argument opposing extension named 
Russian violations of the intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons treaty as a reason not to 
reward Russia.  It asserted that since the world is 
a dangerous place, the U.S. should keep its 
options open about a future expansion of its 
arsenal.  U.S.-Russian information sharing might 
continue in any case on a voluntary basis, it said. 
This was found convincing by just 44%.  A 
majority of Republicans considered it convincing, 
but not overwhelmingly so (55%). In very red 
districts a bare majority found it convincing. Only 
one-third of Democrats found this argument 
convincing (34%); independents were divided. 
Asked to decide whether they favored or 
opposed extending New START, an 
overwhelming four in five (82%) supported 
extension. Three in four Republicans (77%) and 
independents (74%) likewise supported it, as did 
72% of Trump voters and 89% of Democrats. 
Support ranged from 76% in very red districts to 
88% in very blue districts.   
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Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
Two thirds, including a majority of Republicans, oppose withdrawing from the INF Treaty and favor instead 
staying within the Treaty and redoubling efforts to work with the Russians to address concerns of both sides.   
Respondents also evaluated the debate about the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF).  They were 
given a background briefing as follows:  
This treaty was signed by former President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. It prohibits the U.S. 
and Russia (then the Soviet Union) from having land-based missiles with flight ranges between 310 to 3,420 
miles. It was the first treaty to ban a whole class of weapons and included unprecedented on-site inspections.  
 
They were told that “The U.S. has accused Russia of violating the treaty, but Russia has denied it. Similarly, 
Russia has accused the U.S. of violating the treaty, but the U.S. has also denied it.”   
 
Respondents were informed that there is a debate about whether the US should withdraw from the treaty and 
that for the U.S. to withdraw, it must first formally announce that intention (as it in fact did on February 2, 2019, 
one day after fielding ended for this study).  A six-month interval must ensue before withdrawal takes place. 
 
Respondents first evaluated an argument in 
favor of the U.S. withdrawing from INF. It 
referenced longstanding U.S. concerns about 
Russian violations and suggested that 
announcing U.S. withdrawal might serve as a 
‘wake-up call’ that convinces the Russians to fix 
the problem during the six-months before U.S. 
withdrawal takes effect.  It also argued that INF 
has constrained the U.S. from building a class of 
missile that China has developed, “so, freeing 
the U.S. up to develop intermediate-range 
forces may have advantages for us.” 
About two in three (65%) found this argument 
convincing, including 53% of Democrats, 80% of 
Republicans, and 63% of independents. 
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signing the INF Treaty in the 
East Room of the White House, December 8, 1987. 
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The counter argument—which favored 
maintaining INF—pointed out that the weapons 
abolished by the treaty “were very accurate and 
powerful and could destroy leadership and 
military targets in minutes.”  It noted that NATO 
allies still support the agreement and will not 
consent to basing new intermediate-range 
missiles on their soil.  It made two more points:  
• that Russia has stated it is willing to 
negotiate the concerns over INF 
compliance, and  
• that where Asia is concerned, adding 
intermediate-range missiles to the types 
of U.S. weapons already able to hit those 
targets would provide little benefit. 
This argument did slightly better than its counterpart:  68% found it convincing including 58% of Republicans 
and 77% of Democrats. 
Respondents were then asked to choose between two courses of action: 
1. Start the six-month process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, and if the Russians do not make the 
changes the U.S. seeks, withdraw from the Treaty.  
2. Stay within the INF Treaty and redouble efforts to work with the Russians to address concerns of both 
sides. 
 
Two thirds (66%) chose to stay in INF and go 
back to the table with Russia; 30% chose 
withdrawal.   
Although it was being reported in the news at 
the time of the fielding that the Trump 
administration was preparing to initiate the 
formal withdrawal process, 55% of all 
Republicans preferred to stay in, as well as 51% 
of Trump voters.  Even in very red districts, 59% 
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Nuclear Weapons Testing  
Overwhelming majorities from both parties approve of the US continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing, 
effectively abiding by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  In the event the US develops a 
technological innovation that might make it possible to build a new type of nuclear weapon that could 
destroy more of an adversary’s nuclear weapons, a majority still said they would oppose breaking the 
moratorium, though a bare majority of Republicans favored it. 
 
Respondents received background information on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the moratorium on 
nuclear explosions that covered the following points:  
• Between 1942 and the mid-1990s, about two thousand nuclear tests were conducted across the world, 
mostly by the U.S. and the Soviet Union  
• The U.S. ceased testing in the early 1990s and made it a priority to convince other countries not to test 
• Most countries have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which banned all 
nuclear tests.  The U.S. signed, but the Senate voted against ratifying it 
• A global monitoring system watches for evidence of nuclear explosions. Three countries with nuclear 
weapons--India, Pakistan, and Israel--did not sign CTBT, and later North Korea withdrew 
• North Korea is the only country to have tested a nuclear weapon for the past two decades 
• The current administration has said that it will continue to abide by the moratorium, though it reserves 
the right to resume testing if necessary, to ensure the effectiveness as well as the safety of the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal. 
Respondents were asked their views on “the 
U.S. continuing to abide by the moratorium on 
nuclear testing.”  Nearly nine in ten (87%) 
approved, while 12% disapproved.  This 
included 85% of Republicans, 90% of 
Democrats, and 83% of independents.  Trump 
voters were 82% in support. 
Respondents were then given a hypothetical 
scenario that some argue would be a reason 
for the US to break the moratorium on nuclear 
testing.  They were asked to “imagine that the 
U.S. has a technological innovation that some 
weapons developers think might make it 
possible for the U.S. to make a new type of 
nuclear weapon that could more effectively 
destroy some, but not all, of the nuclear 
weapons of an adversary. Developing such a new type of weapon would require that the U.S. test it, which 
would break the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. “   
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They were told, “The question is whether, 
under these circumstances, the U.S. should or 
should not develop and test a new weapon, 
breaking the moratorium against testing 
nuclear weapons,” and were given pro and con 
arguments that fit the scenario. 
The argument for breaking the moratorium 
declared that whatever could be done to 
“reduce the number of weapons that could 
reach the U.S. or its allies,” should be 
done.  Though the innovation might not 
destroy all the adversary’s nuclear weapons, it 
could still help the United States end the 
conflict on better terms—a prospect that would 
help to deter potential enemies. Two thirds 
(66%) found this argument convincing, and this 
result was bipartisan: 58% of Democrats, 75% 
of Republicans and 70% of independents. 
The argument against breaking the moratorium 
insisted that the U.S. would remain vulnerable 
to a major attack even if it increased the 
number of nuclear weapons it could 
destroy.  Adversaries would develop 
countermeasures and increase their nuclear 
arsenals with less vulnerable types of weapons.  
Above all, other countries would also begin 
testing nuclear weapons, which would 
accelerate development of their arsenals. Over 
seven in ten found this counter-argument 
convincing (72%).  Republicans were not 
different from the national level (70%). 
Finally, asked whether—in the scenario 
presented—the U.S. should or should not break 
the moratorium and conduct tests, a 56% 
majority said the U.S. should not test, while 
42% thought it should. Opponents of testing 
included 65% of Democrats and 51% of 
independents.   A bare majority of Republicans 
favored testing (52-47%) as did 54% of Trump 
voters. In very red districts, 53% favored 
testing; in all the other sets of districts, testing 
was rejected in a 54-64% range. 
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US NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES  
 
Minimum Retaliatory Capability 
Eight in ten or more from both parties support the US having a retaliatory nuclear capability destructive 
enough that no country could think that there would be any advantage in attacking the United States with 
nuclear weapons.    
Respondents were introduced to the idea of a minimum requirement for a U.S. nuclear arsenal as follows: 
 
Some people say that the U.S. should have an arsenal that meets the following minimum requirement: 
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must have, at a minimum, enough nuclear 
weapons that could not be destroyed by an all-out surprise nuclear attack, so that the U.S. could always 
retaliate with a major nuclear strike. This potential retaliatory strike needs to be destructive enough that no 
country could think that there would be any 
advantage in attacking the U.S. with nuclear 
weapons.  
They then evaluated arguments for and against 
the U.S. having an arsenal that meets this 
minimum.  The argument in favor rested on 
deterrence— “to make sure that no country can 
possibly think that it makes sense to attack the 
U.S. with nuclear weapons.” It insisted that “the 
U.S. government has a responsibility to its 
people” to “always [have] this ability to 
retaliate.” 
This argument elicited near consensual support, 
with 85% finding it convincing (very, 42%).  All 
partisan groups showed eight in ten or more 
finding the argument convincing, as did all the 
sets of districts. 
The counter argument declared that “using 
nuclear weapons is both immoral and 
impractical,” and that many military experts 
view them as unusable because of the 
uncontrollable nature of a nuclear conflict.  It 
also held that the vast conventional arms of the 
U.S. would still be able to inflict a devastating 
response on the attacker. 
This argument got a divided response, with 50% 
finding it convincing.  The response was 
distinctly partisan: 37% of Republicans found it 
convincing, as compared to 60% of 
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Democrats.  Interestingly, independents did not 
mirror the (divided) national result; instead, 
55% found the counter-argument convincing.  In 
very red districts, 45% said the argument was 
convincing; in very blue districts, 55% did. 
After considering the pro and con arguments, 
respondents were asked whether the U.S. 
should maintain a nuclear arsenal that, at a 
minimum, met the given criteria.  Eighty-five 
percent said the U.S. should: Republicans were 
highest at 94%; Democrats were at 79% and 
independents, 80%. 
Respondents were then asked to give their own 
figure for “how many nuclear weapons… the 
U.S. needs to have that would survive an all-out nuclear attack and could then be used for retaliation?”     
Overall, the median response was 1,000.  
This was the median among Democrats and independents as well.  Republicans’ median  
was 3,000 weapons.   
This finding needs to be viewed carefully, especially the median of 3,000 for Republicans.  Respondents were 
informed initially that the US has a total of about 4,000 nuclear weapons, as well as 1,650 deployed strategic 
weapons.  Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the respondent was selecting the proposed residual size of the 
entire arsenal or the residual size of the deployed strategic arsenal.  Cross tabulations suggest that some 
respondents who gave a number higher than 1,650 were in fact using the 4,000 number as the baseline, 
because a substantial number of them also endorsed the idea of having a nuclear arsenal limited to minimum 
retaliatory capability only, which clearly points to a reduction in the number of weapons in the arsenal, not an 
increase.   
  
Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work tours a B-52 weapons loading training hangar on Minot Air 
Force Base, N.D., February 2015. Work, who chairs the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review 
Group, met with nuclear enterprise airmen. DoD photo by Claudette Roulo 
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Low Yield Warheads and the Need for Matching Nuclear Options 
Respondents were presented a rationale for developing nuclear capabilities over and above the minimum 
retaliatory capability based on the need to threaten to match any type of nuclear capability an adversary 
might use. When presented a specific example of the current debate over whether the US should put low-
yield nuclear warheads on missiles on submarines to match corresponding Russian capabilities, a bipartisan 
majority of two thirds supported adding a low-yield option to nuclear missiles on submarines.  Yet, when 
asked about the general principle, a plurality endorsed the view that a minimum retaliatory capability is 
adequate, over the view that the US must have the capability to retaliate against a major attack using only a 
type of weapon similar to the type the adversary used.  
 
After assessing the minimum requirement for the nuclear arsenal, respondents learned about the debate over 
whether “there are additional requirements that the U.S. needs to meet and that necessitate having more 
nuclear weapons than this minimum.”  They were told that “One such additional requirement is based on the 
possibility that an enemy might make a limited first strike attack against the U.S. or an ally, using only a specific 
type of nuclear weapon. The requirement is that the U.S. must be able to retaliate with a nuclear strike using 
only weapons that are similar to the ones used by the enemy in terms of their explosive power, their speed, and 
how close they are to the area of conflict.” 
They were then told:  
This argument is coming up in a current debate about whether the U.S. needs to respond to new types of Russian 
nuclear weapons by having something similar. The focus of this concern is that the Russians have been 
developing warheads with relatively low explosive power—about half the size of the Hiroshima bomb—that they 
could put on missiles as well as other means of delivery. If Russia were to use such a weapon against a U.S. ally 
close to Russia, the U.S. already has the ability to respond with warheads that have similarly low explosive 
power. But right now, the U.S. can only deliver them by bombers, and it would take up to a few hours for the 
bombers to reach their targets.  Some people say that this is a problem and the U.S. should put nuclear warheads 
with low explosive power on submarine missiles that travel more quickly. 
 
Respondents started with an argument in 
favor of taking this action.  It asserted the 
Russians may believe they can use relatively 
small warheads to their advantage, perhaps 
in a conflict with a U.S. NATO ally.  If the US 
felt it could not retaliate in kind in a timely 
fashion, it might forego a response.  The 
Russians would be more effectively deterred 
if the United States put comparable small 
warheads on submarine-borne missiles to 
show readiness to retaliate in kind. 
About three quarters (73%) found this 
argument convincing.  Republicans, 
Democrats and independents all had 
essentially the same reaction (a range of 69-
79%). 
PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION 16    
 The first counter-argument held that 
“shortening delivery time is not going to 
change Russian thinking” about a U.S. nuclear 
response. It noted that the United States can 
already use planes, particularly Stealth 
bombers, to deliver low-yield weapons. It 
claimed the proposal to put low yield options 
on submarines was “just another excuse… to 
keep building more weapons.” It also 
suggested that this step could be 
destabilizing, making Russians think the US 
was fine-tuning its capacity for a limited 
strike against Russia. 
The first counter argument was found 
convincing by almost three in five 
(58%).  Majorities of Democrats (68%) and 
independents (59%) found it convincing, but less than half of Republicans felt the same (46%).  However, in the 
Congressional districts it was found convincing by majorities in all six classes, ranging from 52 to 68%. 
The second pair of pro and con arguments 
concentrated on the attitudes of U.S. allies 
toward the proposed action.  The argument 
favoring the action asserted that if it were not 
taken, our European allies would perceive 
U.S. commitment in the alliance as wavering 
and would consequently start to 
accommodate Russia, hurting U.S. interests. 
Three in five (62%) found this 
convincing.  These attitudes were bipartisan, 
with 68% of Republicans and 56% of 
Democrats finding the argument convincing. 
The second counter-argument pointed out 
that there was no doubt of the size and 
variety of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and so 
adding yet more would not be reassuring for  
allies.  Rather, maintaining relations that are genuinely close would be the most reassuring action the U.S. could 
take, especially since ordinary European citizens are likely to see new weapons as simply heightening tensions. 
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This con argument did just well as the pro 
argument it countered, with 62% finding it 
convincing.  It also garnered a majority in each 
party, though not by much among Republicans 
(51%), compared with 71% of Democrats. 
After considering these four arguments, 
respondents were asked to conclude whether 
“the U.S. should or should not put nuclear 
warheads with relatively low explosive power on 
missiles on submarines?”   
A clear bipartisan majority of 65% said the U.S. 
should take this specific step: 77% of 
Republicans, 56% of Democrats and 64% of 
independents.  Among the Congressional 
districts, 71% of very red and 61% of very blue 
districts were in favor. 
It is noteworthy, though, that when asked in 
general, less than half agreed with the underlying 
principle that effective deterrence requires the 
United States to have the capability to retaliate 
with a specific type of nuclear weapon similar to 
each type the enemy could use.  
Immediately after being asked about putting low 
yield warheads on submarine launched missiles, 
the same respondents were asked:  
Regardless of whether you think the U.S. 
needs to develop this particular weapon, as a 
general principle do you think that:  
1. If the U.S. has a substantial number of nuclear weapons that would survive an all-out surprise nuclear 
attack against the U.S. and could then be used to retaliate with a major nuclear strike, that is enough. 
2. The U.S. needs more than this ability to retaliate with a major nuclear strike. It also needs to be able to 
retaliate against a major attack using only a type of weapon similar to the type the enemy used, in terms of 
their explosive power, their speed, and how close they are to the area of conflict.  
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Interestingly, only 43% chose the second 
position calling for the ability to respond in 
kind to any nuclear attack, though this was 
the rationale provided for the low yield 
weapon.  Rather a clear plurality (49%) opted 
for the principle that a minimum retaliatory 
capability is adequate, as did 56% of 
Democrats.  Among Republicans, a bare 
majority (51%) endorsed the principle of 
being able to always retaliate in kind, while 
independents were divided.   
 
The spectrum of Congressional districts 
showed no meaningful pattern.  
 
 
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)  
Knowing that the United States currently has strategic weapons on submarines, bombers, and land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, six in ten, including a majority of Republicans, favor phasing out the ICBM 
force.  However, only one-third favor unilaterally reducing the net number of strategic warheads in the U.S. 
arsenal instead of putting more warheads on submarines and bombers to keep the same total as the 
Russians.  
 
Respondents were informed that there is a debate about the U.S.’s land-based strategic missiles 
(intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs) saying that “The U.S. has about 400 [ICBMs] that are active and 
ready to be used. All of them are aging and are scheduled to be replaced by 2030. However, some people say 
that they should not be replaced, but phased out instead.“ 
 
The argument  in favor of phasing out ICBMs 
underscored that ICBMs are stationary and 
cannot be hidden from attack; that since 
they are vulnerable, U.S. decision makers 
might be prone to launch them in response 
to a false alarm; and that over a thousand 
strategic weapons are currently on 
submarines and bombers in any 
case.  Phasing out ICBMs would also save 
$120-140 billion.   
Seventy percent found this argument 
convincing (62% of Republicans and 79% of 
Democrats).  
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The counter argument emphasized the value 
of the strategic triad--the long-standing policy 
that the U.S. can deliver strategic nuclear 
weapons by land-based missiles, sea-based 
missiles, and bombers. It asserted that 
retaining the full triad heightens deterrence, 
and that altering this policy would signal that 
our will is faltering.   
The counter argument also said that a future 
technical development could make 
submarines more detectable and vulnerable 
to attack.  Even if this does not happen, 
phasing out ICBMs would remove some of the 
targets that Russian weapons currently need 
to cover. 
Two thirds (68%) found this argument convincing.  Republicans had a stronger positive response at 80%. Both 
Democrats and independents showed three in five finding the argument convincing.   
Respondents were told there was another debate “about whether, if the U.S. phases out its land-based missiles, 
it should increase the number of warheads on its submarines and bombers.”  On this related debate, 
respondents also dealt with two arguments. 
The argument in favor of increasing warheads on other platforms said simply: 
If we are going to phase out the land-based missiles, we should at least make sure that we keep the same 
number of warheads. Lowering the total number of warheads from 1,550 to 1,150 would be a serious drop. 
The Russians could still have 1,550 warheads so they might think they would have an advantage. 
A little over three in five (63%) found this 
argument convincing.  While this reaction 
was bipartisan, there was a 20-point gap 
between Republicans (75%) and Democrats 
(55%).   
The counter-argument was also brief: 
Having 1,150 warheads would be more 
than plenty for assuring that we can 
deter any potential enemy from attacking 
us. Building additional warheads for 
submarines and bombers would be 
expensive and unnecessary. 
The counter-argument, while found 
convincing by a majority, did not do as well 
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as the pro argument, with 56% finding it 
convincing overall, (Democrats 64%) while 
among Republicans this was only 42%.  
Finally, respondents selected among three 
options:  
1. replace existing land-based missiles 
with new ones 
2. phase-out land-based missiles, but 
maintain the total number of 
warheads at 1,550 by increasing their 
numbers on submarines and bombers 
(savings: $120 billion) 
3. phase-out land-based missiles and  
keep 1,150 warheads on submarines  
and bombers (savings: $140 billion) 
Only a third (32%) wanted to keep and renew 
the ICBM force with new missiles.  Three in 
five (61%) chose one of the two options that 
would phase out land-based missiles.   
 
Thirty-three percent thought that having 
1,150 warheads on submarines and bombers 
was enough even if the Russians still had 
1,550 warheads, while 28% favored 
increasing the number of U.S. warheads on 
submarines and bombers to 1,550 under 
current circumstances (e.g. without a treaty 
limiting both the U.S. and Russia to lower 
warhead numbers). 
Support for phasing out ICBMs cut across party lines. Among Republicans, 53% wanted to phase out land-based 
missiles (20% supporting 1,150 warheads and 33% the 1,550 option).  Among Democrats, 69% wanted to phase 
out land-based missiles (42% supporting 1,150 warheads and 26% the 1,550 option).  Among independents, 57% 
wanted to phase out land-based missiles (39% supporting 1,150 warheads and a lower 18% the 1,550 
option).  Even in very red districts, 58% chose to phase out land-based missiles. 
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FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
  
US Declaratory Policy on First Use  
Only one in five endorsed the United States explicitly declaring that it would consider using nuclear weapons 
first and stating what kinds of non-nuclear attacks would prompt the United States to consider doing so.  Just 
slightly more than one in five favored explicitly declaring that the United States will never use nuclear 
weapons first.  A majority favored continuing the current policy of being ambiguous about whether and under 
what conditions the United States would consider using nuclear weapons first.  Presented a list of possible 
types of attack, less than one in six favored declaring that the United States would consider using nuclear 
weapons in response to any of them.   
 
Respondents were introduced to an issue addressed in the most recent Nuclear Policy Review document: 
whether the U.S. should declare in advance its readiness to consider a nuclear response to a variety of non-
nuclear strategic attacks.  The issue was presented in this way: 
 
Right now, the United States promises never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries 
that do not have nuclear weapons and have allowed international inspectors to verify that they are not trying 
to build them.  
But, for all other cases, the U.S. has been publicly ambiguous about whether it might use nuclear weapons 
first and under what conditions. U.S. officials, under some administrations, have commented that the United 
States would consider responding with nuclear weapons to a major non-nuclear attack on an ally (such as a 
Russian invasion of a NATO country), or one involving biological or chemical weapons. But this has not been a 
formal U.S. policy and such statements have varied with different administrations.  
Respondents were asked to consider two distinct proposals, each of which would end the posture of ambiguity: 
for the U.S. to declare it would consider using nuclear weapons first in certain named circumstances; or, for the 
U.S. to declare “it will never use nuclear weapons first.” 
First, respondents evaluated an argument in 
favor of declaring the U.S. “will consider 
using nuclear weapons first in response to a 
number of specific types of non-nuclear 
attacks.”  It noted that apart from nuclear 
threats, there were other types of grave 
threats against US vital interests, and 
claimed that clearly putting a nuclear 
response to such attacks “on the table” 
would be a powerful deterrent. 
 
This argument was found convincing by two 
thirds (68%) including majorities from both 
parties (79% of Republicans, 62% of 
Democrats). 
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The counter-argument recalled that the nuclear 
threshold has not been crossed since Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki 73 years ago.  If the US makes 
declarations and then deterrence fails, it will be 
under pressure to initiate nuclear use in order to 
preserve the credibility of future threats. Even a 
very limited nuclear response would greatly 
increase the possibility of nuclear use by other 
powers—and make more countries feel 
compelled to acquire nuclear weapons. 
The counter-argument had about the same 
potency as the pro argument, with 70% finding it 
convincing, including large majorities in both 
parties.  
Next, respondents evaluated pro and con 
arguments for a policy shift in the opposite 
direction—the U.S. declaring that it will never 
use nuclear weapons first.  The argument for 
making a No First Use declaration held that 
nuclear threat could only be justified for the 
purpose of deterring a nuclear attack. The mere 
belief in other countries that the U.S. might use 
nuclear weapons for other purposes would 
suggest that nuclear weapons are an “ordinary 
military option.”  This would encourage other 
countries to develop or expand their nuclear 
arsenals.  Hence the best policy would be to 
state the U.S. will never be the first to use 
nuclear weapons in a conflict.  This argument 
was, like the others, found convincing on a 
bipartisan basis (67% overall, 57% of 
Republicans, 76% of Democrats). 
The counter argument—against declaring no 
first use—reminded respondents of other types 
of threats, “such as… the use of chemical or 
biological weapons,” that the current U.S. 
ambiguity about nuclear use could help to 
deter.  It also asserted that if our allies did not 
think the U.S. might possibly use nuclear 
weapons in an extreme case to protect them 
from such attacks, they would tend to think that 
they need their own nuclear arsenals. 
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This counter-argument did slightly less well than the preceding three, with 63% finding it convincing (19% 
very).  Republicans were at 70% and Democrats and independents together at 58-59%. 
Finally, respondents were asked to make a choice from all three options discussed:  
1. explicitly declaring conditions under which the U.S. would consider first use;  
2. the status quo, “continu[ing] to be ambiguous”; or  
3. explicitly declaring the U.S. will never use nuclear weapons first.   
Keeping the current ambiguity on nuclear  
use won an absolute majority—which is   
striking, since three options were 
offered.  There was also an absolute 
majority in each party.  Retaining the 
current ambiguity was supported by 57%, 
including 64% of Republicans, 51% of 
Democrats, and 57% of  
independents. 
Less than a fifth (18%, 20% of Republicans) 
chose the stance taken in the Nuclear 
Policy Review, of explicitly declaring 
possible first-use situations.  Twenty-two 
percent chose declaring a no-first-use 
policy (30% of Democrats).  No class of 
Congressional districts varied meaningfully 
from the overall proportions among the 
three positions. 
Types of Non-Nuclear Attacks 
The study then took the 21% of 
respondents who favored the U.S. 
explicitly declaring that it would consider 
using nuclear weapons first in certain 
situations or who did not take a position 
on the question and presented specific 
types of non-nuclear attacks (others were 
not asked the series because they had 
rejected the option in principle).  For each 
one the subsample was asked whether 
they favored declaring that the United 
States would consider using nuclear 
weapons in response to each of them.   
  
TYPE OF NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK FAVOR 
A major attack using chemical or biological weapons on the U.S. or 
other countries that are our partners or allies 16% 
Non-nuclear attacks on nuclear forces of the U.S. or our allies 11% 
Non-nuclear attacks on systems that provide warning about attacks 
on the U.S. or our allies and damage assessments 11% 
A major non-nuclear attack on military forces of the U.S. or other 
countries that are our partners or allies 10% 
A major non-nuclear attack on civilians in the U.S. or other countries 
that are our partners or allies 10% 
Non-nuclear attacks on infrastructure in the U.S. or other countries 
that are our partners or allies 9% 
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Only one option elicited clear majority support among the 21% of the sample that was asked the question (16% 
of the full sample): “A major attack using chemical or biological weapons on the U.S. or… partners or allies.”  All 
others were endorsed by a bare majority of the sample asked or fewer and about one in ten of the full sample.  
The chart shows all the types of attacks in descending order of support for making an advance declaration. 
Limiting Presidential First Use 
Two thirds, including six in ten Republicans, support Congressional legislation requiring that to use nuclear 
weapons first, the President would first have to consult Congress and it would have to issue a declaration of 
war on the country to be attacked with nuclear weapons. 
A large bipartisan majority endorsed the idea behind legislation pending in Congress that would require the 
President, before making first use of nuclear weapons, to consult Congress and request a declaration of 
war.  (The bill makes an exception for the President to respond to intelligence that a nuclear attack from a 
foreign power is immanent.) 
Respondents were reminded that “only the President has the authority to order the launch of nuclear weapons 
and he is not required to consult with or get approval from Congress.”  They were told that in the proposed 
legislation, the President would keep “the authority to use nuclear weapons in response to the launch of a 
nuclear strike against the U.S. or an ally.”  But to use nuclear weapons first would require Congressional 
consultation, and Congress would have to vote to declare war. 
The argument favoring the legislation 
reminded respondents that starting a nuclear 
war would be too consequential for any 
president to make on his own. The president 
should need approval from Congress, the 
branch of government that the Founders 
entrusted with the decision to go to war.  
Almost four in five (78%) found this argument 
convincing (47% very). This was true of 63% of 
Republicans and 91% of Democrats. 
The counter-argument pointed out that the 
president is the commander-in-chief of U.S. 
armed forces and has the authority to act 
promptly to defend the country.   
Congress—which has not voted a declaration 
of war since World War II—will “make it 
extremely hard to get the necessary approval”  
if this requirement is imposed on the president.  This would weaken deterrence, emboldening potential 
adversaries. 
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The counter-argument was not received nearly 
as well as the pro argument. Still, a modest 
majority (53%) did find it convincing.  There 
was a strong partisan divide, with 75% of 
Republicans giving weight to the counter-
argument, but only 34% of Democrats.  
Independents were divided.   
 
In the Congressional districts, 59% of 
respondents in very red districts found it 
convincing, while only 46% of respondents in 
blue and very blue districts gave it weight. 
Respondents were then asked whether 
Congress should or should not pass a law 
saying that: 
• The President would still have the sole 
authority to order the use of nuclear 
weapons in response to a nuclear attack.  
• To use nuclear weapons first, the President 
would first have to consult Congress, which 
would have to issue a declaration of war on 
the country to be attacked with nuclear 
weapons. 
Two-thirds (68%) thought the bill should be 
passed into law. This was bipartisan, with 59% 
of Republicans and 74% of Democrats agreeing 
(Independents, 73%). Only thirty percent of all 
respondents opposed legislation requiring the 
president to get Congressional approval before 
starting a nuclear war.  Among those who 
approve of Trump, 58% favored the law.   
Testing of the Peacekeeper ICBM re-entry vehicles  at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, 1983. 
The Program for Public Consultation is part of the School of Public Policy at the University 
of Maryland.  It seeks to improve democratic governance by consulting the 
citizenry on key public policy issues  governments face.  It has developed innovative 
survey methods that simulate the process that policymakers go through—getting a 
briefing, hearing arguments, dealing with tradeoffs—before coming to their conclusion. 
It also uses surveys to help find common ground between conflicting parties.  
The Center for International and Security Studies at 
Maryland (CISSM) conducts research, informs policy 
debates, and helps current and future leaders find 
creative solutions to complex global challenges. Three 
cross-cutting themes connect faculty, researchers, 
and students working on CISSM’s research agenda:
 
• Reducing risks from dual-use technologies
• Enhancing human security 
• Improving multi-stakeholder governance
CISSM is well connected to policy debates and practitioners, and offers its researchers and 
students opportunities to develop broad perspectives on security, economic, and international 
development issues.
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